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THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY IN A UNIFIED NATIONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Dennis J. McMahon ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, the federal government has set its sights
on enacting legislation to establish a national infrastructure for the
1
storage and transmission of electronic health records. In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) to protect individuals from abuse by health insurance companies and to provide a “floor” of mandatory privacy standards for
2
certain healthcare entities. HIPAA, as well as other federal privacy
3
protections, however, has become antiquated and inadequate. Thus,
members of Congress are currently considering an array of bills intended to regulate the use of medical information by the healthcare
4
industry.
The federal government’s current approach to increasing efficiency in healthcare, while lowering its cost by creating a national
electronic health information infrastructure, will significantly impact
5
personal privacy and the ability to secure such information. It is imperative, therefore, that this legislation include provisions that safeguard personal privacy and protect confidential information from potential third-party abuse.
∗

J.D. candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.M.E., 2005, Villanova University.
1
See United States Health Service Act, H.R. 2061, 103d Cong. (1993) (establishing a United States Health Service to coordinate state and local healthcare entities);
H.R. 1534, 102d Cong. (1991) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study national healthcare systems of other developed countries and to make
recommendations for legislation based on its findings to improve healthcare in the
U.S.); National Health Care and Cost Containment Act, H.R. 2530, 102d Cong.
(1991) (granting financial and other incentives to assist and encourage creation of a
universal healthcare system).
2
See infra Part II.E.
3
See infra Part II.B–E.
4
See infra Part III.
5
Id.
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Along with the benefits of a unified, national healthcare infrastructure come the problems associated with increased access to
6
health records and electronically stored information. That various
institutions have incentives to misappropriate medical information
7
augments the need for a solution. There are, however, several
methods of privacy protection available to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the negative effects on information privacy and security that a
8
national healthcare infrastructure will engender.
This Comment begins with an overview of the current state of
healthcare privacy law and the need for adequate privacy protection.
Part III then describes and analyzes selected bills which are paradigmatic of the various approaches that Congress currently contemplates. Part IV examines different methods of privacy protection
available to supplement these bills. Part IV also argues that the most
effective way to protect personal privacy in a national health information infrastructure is through a multi-layered approach which utilizes
a new property right in personal information along with contractual
and tort-based protection.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Need for Privacy
As health information has become increasingly computerized,
the risks associated with misappropriation are heightened. The electronic storage and transmission of health information creates opportunities for such information to be accidentally or intentionally dis9
closed to the wrong people.
Moreover, the consequences of
misappropriation are especially severe within the realm of health10
related information.
Transmission of health information through the Internet allows
“information to be transmitted anywhere in the world quickly,
6

See infra Part II.A.
Id.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
Sonia W. Nath, Relief for the E-Patient? Legislative and Judicial Remedies to Fill
HIPAA’s Privacy Gaps, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 530 (2006).
10
Protection of health records is especially important because of the personal
nature of the information they contain as well as the importance of health record
integrity. See Errors Across the Internet, CONSUMER REPORTS.ORG, Mar. 2006, http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/health-fitness/health-care/electronic-medical-records-306
/errors-across-the-internet/index.htm; Safeguarding Against Theft, CONSUMERREPORTS
.ORG, Mar. 2006, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health-fitness/health-care/
electronic-medical-records-306/safeguarding-against-theft/index.htm.
7

MCMAHON_FINALV2

2008]

4/11/2008 10:59:23 AM

789

COMMENT
11

cheaply, and with relatively little risk of detection.” Moreover, electronic health records have the ability to contain vast amounts of sen12
sitive information. Additionally, it can be difficult to permanently
delete information from a hard drive, leaving many files available for
misappropriation, despite a healthcare entity’s best efforts to destroy
13
personal information. Many computer programs store information
in hidden files, which can contain large amounts of confidential in14
formation and can be misappropriated. There are also risks associated with employees’ authorized access to such information. Some
privacy experts believe that the most critical risks to healthcare in15
formation are disgruntled employees and social engineering. Further, when electronic data is divulged online, it is difficult to remove
16
and becomes available to anyone.
Individuals that have been
harmed by such disclosure may have little recourse, since it can be
17
difficult to ascertain which party is responsible for the disclosure.
There have been too many examples of health information privacy being compromised over the last few years. In 2001, a security
breach caused Eli Lilly & Co. to distribute emails containing the
email addresses of 699 users of Prozac, an anti-depressant manufac18
In 2005, approximately ten million records
tured by the company.
19
were reported missing between February and June alone. In Janu-

11

Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 332 (2007).
12
Mitchelle C. Pierre, New Technology, Old Issues: The All-Digital Hospital and Medical Information Privacy, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 547 (2004) (“Patient medical records
have come to include more sensitive information such as HIV status, psychiatric records, lifestyle details, and genetic information.”).
13
See John R. Mallery, Secure File Deletion: Fact or Fiction?, SANS INSTITUTE, July 16,
2001, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/incident/631.php?portal=5
e905d2d4abce38f2e1de8f3f10812c6.
14
Id.
15
See Malcom Allen, Social Engineering: A Means to Violate a Computer System, SANS
INSTITUTE, June 2006, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/engineeri
ng/529.php?portal=4b978ba268574768302191032cc4a58f. Social engineering has
been defined as “[a] euphemism for non-technical or low-technology means—such
as lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats—used to attack information systems.” Id. at 4.
16
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 335.
17
Id.
18
News Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach, (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/
01/elililly.htm.
19
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 332.
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ary 2006, hackers gained access to a Notre Dame database. In April
2006, a man was arrested for hacking into a University of Southern
California database and accessing the records of over 270,000 appli21
cants. In May 2006, hackers misappropriated the health and financial information of 200,000 individuals from an Ohio University data22
Many pharmaceutical companies do not “review[] the
base.
effectiveness of their security policies and procedures” and only
eighty-two percent of pharmaceutical companies reported feeling
23
confident in their ability to protect private information. Further,
according to one survey, eighty-four percent of all large businesses in
the United Kingdom experienced premeditated and malicious secu24
rity breaches in 2006.
Arguably, however, the most severe threats to health information
privacy come from private business entities. Personal health information may be used by employers to hire only healthy employees and
thereby reduce insurance costs; by banks to ensure repayment of
loans; by drug companies seeking to target individuals and doctors
for marketing products; and by health insurance companies for set25
Correspondingly, studies have shown
ting insurance premiums.
that between thirty-five and fifty percent of America’s largest compa26
nies use personal health records to make employment decisions.
Consequently, the data mining and warehousing industry has flourished since the early 1990s, amassing astronomically vast amounts of

20

Greg Sandoval, Notre Dame Probes Hack of Computer System, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan.
23, 2006, http://news.com.com/Notre+Dame+probes+hack+of+computer+system/
2100-1029_3-6030229.html?tag=st.rn.
21
Stefanie Olsen, Man Charged with Hacking USC Database, CNETNEWS.COM, Apr.
20, 2006, http://news.com.com/Man+charged+with+hacking+USC+database/21007350_3-6063470.html?tag=st.rn.
22
Greg Sandoval, Ohio University Suffers Security Breaches, CNETNEWS.COM, May 11,
2006, http://news.com.com/2100-7349_3-6071505.html.
23
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, THE 2004 GLOBAL INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY
(2005) available at http://www.biznespolska.pl/files/reports/Pharma%20Alert_
Dec%202004%20_Security%20Survey_v7.pdf.
24
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, INFORMATION
SECURITY BREACHES SURVEY 2006 (2006) available at http://www.pwc.com/uk/eng/
ins-sol/publ/pwc_dti-fullsurveyresults_execsum06.pdf.
25
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 334.
26
See Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t. Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm.
on Gov’t. Reform & Oversight, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy,
Georgetown University) (stating that thirty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies
use health information in employment decisions); see also ROSS J. ANDERSON, SECURITY
IN CLINICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (British Medical Association) (1996) available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/policy11.pdf.
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27

personal information. Currently, over one thousand data mining
and warehousing companies are collecting the personal information
28
of American consumers. Moreover, these companies keep information on virtually every household; some claiming to have amassed
29
over one thousand pieces of data on the average household. Similarly, a company known as the Medical Information Bureau (MIB)
amasses personal health information about almost everyone obtain30
ing, or attempting to obtain, health insurance. Insurance companies typically gather this information when an individual applies for
31
health insurance and then report it to the MIB in a series of codes.
Although the MIB keeps its list of codes secret, researchers claim that
the MIB uses hundreds of codes to describe information including
AIDS, diabetes, heart problems, drug use, smoking, adverse driving
32
records, hazardous sports, sexual deviance, and sloppy appearance.
Subsequently, when an individual applies for insurance with another
insurance company, this information is used to deny coverage or to
33
raise premiums. Unfortunately, HIPAA does not protect this information because the MIB codes are not considered protected health
34
information.
Increased consumer awareness of the potential harm caused by
misuse of personal information has led to inefficiency in healthcare.
Physicians depend on patients to provide truthful and complete in35
formation. As one commentator noted, “[i]f patients have concerns
about the privacy of their health information, they are less likely to
divulge pertinent information for fear of inappropriate disclosures,
36
which could result in inappropriate or incorrect treatment.” In fact,
a recent National Consumer Health Privacy survey showed that sixtyseven percent of the population is “somewhat” to “very” concerned
27

Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the
Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1,
2 (2003).
28
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response
to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003).
29
Id. at 65–66.
30
See Simson Garfinkel, Nobody Knows the MIB, in INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 348–
50 (2006).
31
See id.; see also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 8: Medical Records Privacy, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8-med.htm#C (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
32
See Garfinkel, supra note 30, at 349.
33
See id.
34
See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 31. The MIB, however, is a consumer reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id.
35
Nath, supra note 9, at 530–31.
36
Id. at 531.
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37

about medical record confidentiality. Additionally, thirteen percent
admitted to avoiding disclosure to medical practitioners in some way
38
Similarly, a study by the American
to protect their information.
Health Information Management Association showed that thirty percent of healthcare providers reported an increase in patients who ask
questions about privacy concerns, while twenty-two percent have reported an increase in the number of patients who refuse to sign re39
lease of information forms. Therefore, the current lack of adequate
privacy protection frustrates the goal of increasing the quality of
40
healthcare. Creating a national health information infrastructure
will only augment the loss of privacy associated with the increase in
41
health information technology.
B. Constitutional Protection
The Bill of Rights provided the earliest and most basic privacy
42
protection for American citizens. Although the Framers of the Constitution arguably could not have envisioned the stark increase in
technology—along with the increase in the complexity of daily life
which has given rise to a need for information privacy protection—
the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Constitu43
tion to include a right of privacy in one’s personal information. As
applied to private health information, however, the right has a very
narrow scope and is limited to provide inadequate privacy protection
44
for confidential medical information.
The Supreme Court first articulated a fundamental right to pri45
vacy in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford. There, the Court held that a
37

Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 335 (citing LYNNE BISHOP ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH PRIVACY SURVEY
2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2005)).
38
Id. (“Furthermore, thirteen percent of respondents claimed that they had attempted to protect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-of-pocket so
that no medical documentation would be sent to insurance companies.”).
39
AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF
HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 12–14 (April 2006).
40
Nath, supra note 9, at 531.
41
See Pierre, supra note 12, at 547–48.
42
See U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
43
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–602 nn.23–24 (1977). Although the Court
held that there was no constitutional privacy violation in the statute, it provided examples of different types of constitutional privacy protection for information and explained that the scope of privacy protection is unclear. Id.
44
See infra notes 52–69 and accompanying text.
45
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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plaintiff could not be compelled to undergo a surgical examination
46
in a civil action. The Court described a “sacred” right of privacy
47
that must be “carefully guarded.” Moreover, in Griswold v. Connecti48
cut, the Supreme Court interpreted the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments as incidents of the Bill of Rights protecting a
49
greater, fundamental concept of a right to privacy. Subsequently,
the Court considerably expanded this right when it applied the fun50
damental right to privacy under various circumstances. Beginning
in the late 1970s, however, a judicial trend emerged to limit the scope
of constitutional privacy protection specifically pertaining to medical
51
information.
52
Whalen v. Roe was the first major case limiting constitutional
53
protection for private medical information. Whalen involved a controversial New York law which required detailed information regard54
ing patients who received Schedule II prescription drugs to be
55
stored in a government database. The Court identified two categories of personal privacy violations: “disclosure of personal matters”
and preventing “independence in making certain kinds of important
56
decisions.” Further, the Court acknowledged the danger and negative consequences associated with maintaining a database of confi57
dential medical records. Nevertheless, the Court determined that
the threat posed by the law did not meet the threshold of severity
58
Thus, the scope of
necessary to be violative of the Constitution.
46

Id. at 255.
Id. at 251.
48
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49
Id. at 484–85.
50
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a state law prohibiting sodomy between same-sex couples); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding a state law prohibiting abortion invalid for interfering with a constitutional right
to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding the fundamental
right to privacy in the use of contraceptive devices found in Griswold v. Connecticut to
protect non-married individuals).
51
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–07 (1977).
52
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
53
Id. at 598–605.
54
New York State law classifies the most dangerous prescription drugs as Schedule II prescription drugs. Id. at 593 & n.8. These drugs have legitimate medical purposes but are highly likely to be abused. Id.
55
Id. at 593.
56
Id. at 598–600.
57
Id. at 604–07.
58
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04. Although the Court did not explicitly state the
level of severity needed to implicate a violation of constitutional privacy protection, it
noted that “neither the immediate nor the threatened impact . . . on either the reputation or the independence of patients . . . is sufficient to constitute an invasion of
47
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constitutional protection for medical information privacy was unclear
after Whalen. Although the Court did not eliminate the possibility
that a constitutional cause of action would lie, it set a high threshold
59
for success on such a claim.
60
In Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, confronting what many
would consider an egregious misappropriation and disclosure of per61
sonal information, further restricted the role of the Constitution in
62
protecting health information privacy.
In that case, a state employer discovered an employee’s status as an AIDS patient by viewing
prescription drug records provided pursuant to a health insurance
63
agreement. Thereafter, the employer disclosed this information to
64
other employees. The plaintiff, known as Doe, consequently sued
the employer, alleging that the employer violated his constitutional
65
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court used
a seven-factor test, first articulated in United States v. Westinghouse Elec66
tric Corp., to determine whether the interest in reducing the cost of
health insurance and preventing fraud outweighed the invasion of
67
Doe’s personal privacy. Moreover, the court noted that the distinguishing factor between this case and prior cases, in which the privacy

any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. Concurring, Justice Brennan stated that the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” is
not “seriously enough invaded” in this case because the State limited the number of
people with access to this information and put restrictions on disclosure. Id. at 606
(Brennan, J., concurring). However, Justice Brennan noted that new computer
technology “vastly increase[s] the potential for abuse of that information,” and that
in the future there may be a need to “curb . . . such technology.” Id. at 607.
59
See id. at 603–07 (majority opinion).
60
72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
61
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1438–39 (2001).
62
Doe, 72 F.3d 1133.
63
Id. at 1135–36.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1137–38.
66
638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
67
Doe, 72 F.3d at 1140 (citing Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578).
Westinghouse mandates a consideration of seven different factors. They
are: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or
might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and
(7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public
policy, or other recognizable public interest favoring access.
Id.
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interest prevailed, was the lack of harm caused by collecting and us68
ing Doe’s data. However, this decision ignores serious intangible
69
and psychological harm in favor of a mild state interest.
In the wake of these cases, it is apparent that constitutional privacy protection is too limited to adequately handle the privacy risks
associated with a unified national health information infrastructure.
First, the courts have failed to conceptualize the potential scope of
70
the harm caused by breaches of privacy in health information. The
court in Doe did not understand that “[Doe’s] real injury was the
powerlessness of having no idea who else knew he had HIV, what his
employer thought of him, or how the information could be used
against him. . . . [T]he information appeared to be entirely out of
71
anyone’s control.” Second, the courts have not accurately realized
the range of security risks posed by electronic storage of health information. This is evident from the Whalen Court’s pronouncement
that disclosure of medical information can occur in only three ways:
through(1) either deliberate or negligent employee action, (2) evi72
dence in a judicial proceeding, or (3) voluntary disclosure. Obviously, in a national infrastructure of databases that transmits information electronically to doctors, insurance companies, patients, and
other medical staff, there are many ways in which personal data may
be misappropriated. The failure to grasp both the nature of the
harm caused by a breach of privacy and the methods by which data
can be misappropriated has caused lower courts to adopt tests for
constitutional privacy violations that reduce the weight given to privacy concerns in favor of marginally legitimate state interests in ob73
taining information.
C. State and Common Law Information Privacy Protection
State and common law privacy protection is inadequate because,
in addition to varying between states, it tends to focus on physicianpatient confidentiality, which can only cover a small portion of the

68

Doe, 72 F.3d at 1140–43.
See Solove, supra note 61, at 1438.
70
See id.
71
Id. at 1438–39.
72
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977). Although the Court was specifically addressing privacy concerns regarding the New York statute at issue in this case,
the Court stated generally that “[p]ublic disclosure of patient information can come
about in three ways.” Id.
73
Pierre, supra note 12, at 564.
69
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threats to data in a national health information infrastructure.
Since actions which allege breaches of confidentiality are typically
only successful if they also allege a fiduciary relationship between a
doctor and a patient, such actions cannot be brought against many
third-party practitioners or entities who interact with or maintain pa75
tient information. Yet these entities are equally capable of divulging
private medical information and can be entirely out of the reach of
traditional tort law. As one commentator points out, because the
health record itself contains information collected by several primary
and secondary sources, “[f]ocusing legal protection on a single
therapeutic relationship within this information environment is an
76
anachronistic vestige of an earlier and simpler time in medicine.”
Thus, the current scheme of common law tort protection will not satiate the need for adequate privacy protection in a national health77
care information infrastructure.
D. The Privacy Act of 1974
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”) in response to growing public concern over government agencies using
electronic means to amass large databases that contain personal in78
formation. The Privacy Act aimed to abate these concerns by allowing individuals to access and control records stored by the federal
government and by limiting the government’s ability to use and dis79
This attempt at omnibus legislation,
close private information.
which requires government compliance with fair information practices, is incapable of sufficiently protecting individuals’ health infor80
mation in a national healthcare information infrastructure.

74

See JOY PRITTS ET AL., THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY (Georgetown University 2d
ed. 2002)(1999)(surveying and comparing various state privacy laws) available at
http://medicalrecordrights.georgetown.edu/pdfs/statereport1.pdf; see also Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 511–12 (1995).
75
Gostin, supra note 74, at 512. Third-party practitioners and entities could include nurses, medical testing facilities, medical testing technicians, or other agents
and employees of a healthcare entity who do not interact directly with the patient.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Nationalization of Health Information Privacy Protections, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 293 (2002).
78
JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF
1974: SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 1–9 (1976).
79
Id. at 161–62 (containing the code of fair information practices, which lists the
eight principles which guided the creation of the privacy act).
80
See infra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
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The protection afforded by the Privacy Act is insufficient since it
81
applies only to federal agencies. The Privacy Act does not offer protection to individuals from abuse by private sector entities or from
82
government entities at the state level. This boundary of Privacy Act
protection renders it ineffective in protecting health information in a
83
Moreover, the
healthcare regime dominated by private industry.
Privacy Act has often been criticized because it allows federal agencies
to hire private database companies to compile, use, and disclose confidential information in ways that would violate the Privacy Act if car84
ried out by a federal agency. Because it regulates only federal agencies, the Privacy Act shifts federal privacy abuses to the private sector,
where there is no privacy regulation. Thus, the protection offered by
the Privacy Act is minimal in a uniform national health information
infrastructure.
Additionally, the Privacy Act is insufficient because it includes
many exceptions to its regulations that have been abused and treated
as loopholes. Perhaps the most glaring loophole in the Privacy Act is
85
the “Routine Use” exception. This exception allows federal agencies to disclose personal information if they determine that the disclosure is part of the routine use of information and it is compatible
86
This
with the original purpose for collecting the information.
grants the agency broad discretion to make its own determination regarding the purpose for collecting information and whether the dis87
closure is compatible with such a purpose.
Another exception allows a federal agency to transfer information to another federal agency upon the written request of the receiv88
ing agency. Further, federal agencies are aided in avoiding the Pri-

81

5 U.S.C. §§ 552(f)(1), 552a(a)(1) (2000).
See id.
83
Pierre, supra note 12, at 554–55.
84
Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COMM. REG. 595, 622–23 (2004). The Privacy Act mandates that a private agency
hired by contract by a federal agency will be treated as an employee of the federal
agency and will be subject to the requirements of the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(m)(1) (2000). However, the Act specifically exempts a consumer reporting
agency from being considered a contractor under this section, and thus, from the
requirements of the Privacy Act. Id. § 552a(m)(2).
85
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
86
Id.
87
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 583–86 (2d ed. 2006).
88
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).
82
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vacy Act by its vague language and lack of legislative history. Consequently, the Privacy Act cannot be relied upon to protect private
medical information.
E. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
90

In 1996, Congress passed HIPAA to prevent insurance compa91
nies and healthcare providers from abusing the privacy of patients.
In its final form, HIPPA includes privacy and security regulations,
which attempt to control the use and transmission of heath informa92
tion. These regulations were meant to establish national minimum
93
standards for health information privacy. Thus, HIPAA establishes a
floor for health information privacy but does not preempt stronger
94
state protection. Nevertheless, more adequate standards must be
implemented because there are several deficiencies in the HIPAA
95
privacy and security rules.
HIPAA required Congress to pass privacy legislation by 1999 as
96
part of its Administrative Simplification provisions. However, Congress did not carry out this obligation, and the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) created its own privacy regulations pur97
98
suant to HIPAA in 2000, known as the Privacy Rule. Thereafter,
HHS received a deluge of comments from the public regarding the
complexity of the Privacy Rule, problems with its consent require99
ment, and the cost of implementing the regulations. Consequently,

89

Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v.
Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 86 (2005).
90
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
91
H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 69–70 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865,
1868–69.
92
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–164.534 (2007).
93
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82462, 82471 (Dec. 28, 2000).
94
Id.
95
See infra Part II.E.
96
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, Title II, Subtitle F, §§ 261–264, 110 Stat. 2033. The Administrative Simplification provisions are a portion of HIPAA that were implemented to establish “a national health care fraud and abuse control program.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 67
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1866.
97
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to -8 (2000).
98
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 82462.
99
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed.
Reg. 53182, 53183, 53209 (Aug. 18, 2002). The consent requirement required cov-
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in March 2001, HHS amended the Privacy Rule and allowed the pub100
After much debate, the
lic to comment on proposed regulations.
101
The Final PriFinal Privacy Rule was promulgated in August 2002.
vacy Rule has been criticized for, among other things, its lack of consent requirements that were incorporated in the initial Privacy Rule
102
and for its use of confusing and vague language.
The Final Privacy Rule applies to certain “covered entities,”
which include health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and health103
care providers.
A “health plan” is a group or individual plan pro104
viding or paying for medical care. A “health care clearinghouse” is
105
Finally, a “health
an entity that processes medical information.
care provider” is an entity that provides “medical or health services”
or an entity that “furnishes, bills, or is paid for healthcare in the
106
Moreover, certain “hybrid entities”
normal course of business.”
107
must comply with HIPAA regulations.
A hybrid entity is one that
108
provides healthcare services in addition to several other services.
These hybrid entities must comply with the regulations only to the
109
extent that they deal with medical information.
Thus, HIPAA protection for medical information applies only to healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare providers, healthcare plans, and to a lesser degree, hybrid entities.
HIPAA privacy regulations apply to all types of “individually
identifiable health information,” in both electronic and paper
110
form.
Individually identifiable information includes information
that is created or received by a covered entity and is related to the
physical or mental condition of an individual, the “provision of
111
The
health care to an individual,” or the payment for healthcare.
information must either identify an individual or be reasonably trace112
able to an individual.
Individually identifiable information can be
ered entities to get the patient’s consent before disclosing protected health information for certain uses. See id. at 53209.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 53182.
102
See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11.
103
45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2007).
104
Id. § 160.103.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. § 164.504.
108
Id.
109
45 C.F.R. § 160.504.
110
Id. § 160.103.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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“de-identified,” and thus, is not subject to the HIPAA regulations.
The definitions for individually identifiable information can be very
confusing, and there is little supplemental information guiding covered entities in distinguishing non-identifiable information from in114
dividually identifiable information.
HIPAA attempts to safeguard privacy by regulating the circumstances under which individually identifiable information may be
used and transmitted. HIPAA allows covered entities to disclose protected health information, without the individual’s authorization, to
the individual, or for treatment, payment, and healthcare opera115
tions.
For other disclosures, authorization by the individual is re116
quired.
Disclosures requiring authorization include disclosures for
117
118
marketing purposes, disclosure to an employer, and fundrais119
Moreover, any use of psychotherapy notes requires authorizaing.
120
tion by the individual. In the event of a disclosure, the covered entity must also reasonably limit the information disclosed to the
121
minimum amount necessary.
Additionally, the Final Privacy Rule includes the HIPAA Security
122
Rule. The Security Rule mandates that covered entities implement
safeguards to protect individually identifiable information transmit123
ted or maintained electronically.
The Security Rule is based on
113

Id. § 164.502(d)(2).
HHS defines individually identifiable information as “information, including
demographic data, that relates to: the individual’s past, present or future physical or
mental health or condition, the provision of health care to the individual, or the
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual,
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe
can be used to identify the individual.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS,
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 4 (2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy
summary.pdf. However, HHS does not explain how to determine whether there is a
reasonable basis to believe information can be used to identify the individual. See id.
115
45 C.F.R. § 164.502.
116
Id. § 164.508.
117
However, “marketing” does not include marketing of services by the covered
entities that are health-related. Id. § 164.501. Therefore, if a covered entity seeks to
market health-related services to an individual, “the individual cannot opt out or remove herself from the mailing list.” SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 87, at 383.
118
This includes employer disclosure used for employment decisions. SOLOVE,
ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 383.
119
Id.
120
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.508).
121
45 C.F.R. § 164.502. This provision does not apply to disclosures to the individual or for the treatment of the individual. SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra
note 87, at 384.
122
45 C.F.R. § 164.302–.318 (2007).
123
Id. § 160.103.
114
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four general requirements with which covered entities must comply:
(1) to maintain “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” in their
electronic health information, (2) to “protect the data against reasonably anticipated threats to its security or integrity,” (3) to prevent
“impermissible use or disclosure of the information,” and (4) to en124
The Security
sure employee compliance with the Security Rule.
Rule also requires covered entities to carry out assessments of their
compliance with the rule, and to designate a “security official” to
125
A covered entity
manage employee access to health information.
126
must be prepared to deal with a security breach and limit its effects.
Finally, the Security Rule establishes both physical and technical safeguards to prevent unauthorized access to protected health informa127
tion. Many of these physical and technical safeguards, however, are
128
addressable and can be waived under various circumstances.
The Final Privacy Rule has been criticized for lacking compre129
hensive authorization requirements.
The Final Privacy Rule requires an individual’s authorization for all uses of individually identifiable information, unless used for “treatment, payment, or health
130
care operations.” There are, however, various circumstances under
which a healthcare provider can condition an individual’s treatment
131
on such authorization.
Conditioning authorization on treatment
can, consequently, cause an ill patient to consent when she normally
would not. Additionally, although consent is required for the use
and disclosure of protected health information by third parties for
132
marketing purposes, a covered entity can use protected health information to market its own health-related products without authori-

124

Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 339 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)
(2005)).
125
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a).
126
Id.
127
Id. § 164.310–.312.
128
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 339–40.
129
See June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Commercial Use of Protected Health Information Under
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: Reasonable Disclosure or Disguised Marketing?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 741
(2004).
130
SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 382 (citing 45 C.F.R. §
164.508(a) (2006)).
131
Id. Medical care can be conditioned on research-related disclosure and on the
ability to use the information “to determine whether the individual is eligible for
benefits or enrollment under a health plan, and for underwriting or risk rating determinations.” Id. Also, payment for treatment can be conditioned on disclosure so
long as disclosure is needed for the payment. Id.
132
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i) (2007).
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133

zation. Thus, “a patient cannot opt out or remove herself from the
134
mailing list.”
In 2002, the Final Privacy Rule was amended to replace consent
requirements with notice requirements for certain uses and disclo135
sures of protected health information. The notice provisions in the
Final Privacy Rule are intended to educate patients about privacy
rights and concerns, as well as the potential uses of their informa136
tion. Privacy notices are ineffective for many reasons. First, privacy
notices deprive the patient of the ability to discuss the use of her in137
formation with employees of the covered entity.
Second, covered
entities are not required to discuss in the notices any potential uses or
138
disclosures specific to that individual entity.
Finally, there is no requirement that patients understand notices, thus covered entities often provide confusing notices to hinder their patients’ ability to com139
The result is that
prehend the potential uses and disclosures.
140
notice requirements do little to protect health information privacy.
Furthermore, HIPAA’s Security Rule is inoperative against the
various threats posed by those seeking to misappropriate personal
141
data.
The regulations in the Security Rule allow covered entities
142
broad discretion in implementing their standards.
For example,
security regulations, which are not mandatory, can be modified or
143
As such, covered entichanged depending on the circumstances.
ties can choose to implement an “equivalent alternative measure” or
not to implement the requirement at all if it is not “reasonable and
144
appropriate.” Moreover, the regulations are vague and allow an entity to determine what security measures “reasonably and appropri145
ately” meet the implementation standards.
Additionally, covered
133

SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 383 (citing 45 C.F.R. §
164.501 (2006)).
134
Id.
135
45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a) (2007).
136
Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 592–
93 (2004).
137
See Makdisi, supra note 129, at 759.
138
Id. The notice requirement only requires entities to disclose “‘sufficiently detailed’ descriptions of uses and disclosures that are permissible under the rule.” Id.
139
See Pollio, supra note 136.
140
Id.
141
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 336–37.
142
Id. at 337, 350–53.
143
Id. at 339–40.
144
Id. at 339–40, 350–53.
145
Id.
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entities are directed to protect the information against “reasonably
anticipated threats,” and therefore they are left to determine which
146
The broad discretion given
threats can be reasonably anticipated.
to covered entities, as well as the ability to interpret vague regula147
tions, allows covered entities to decrease privacy protection.
Finally, enforcement of the Privacy Rule is insufficient under
HIPAA. HIPAA allows for both civil and criminal penalties against an
individual who knowingly obtains or discloses personally identifiable
148
information. In addition, covered entities are liable for disclosures
149
of protected information in violation of the Privacy Rule. However,
the Secretary of HHS can only fine covered entities a maximum of
$100 per violation, and not more than $25,000 per year for multiple
150
Criminal penalties do not apply at all in cases
identical violations.
of willful misappropriation by violators who are neither covered entities or employees of covered entities acting within the scope of their
151
Moreover, the Secretary of HHS rarely imposes civil
employment.
152
penalties: although HHS received 19,420 complaints between April
153
2003 and June 2006, it did not issue a single civil fine.
Further,
HIPAA does not provide for private causes of action, and HHS hearings do not provide monetary damages as a form of relief for harmed
154
individuals.
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, as well as the other privacy protections
presently available, will be unable to handle the increased threats to
155
privacy in a national healthcare information infrastructure.
The
need for enhanced privacy and security protections is exacerbated by
the computerization of health records and the increasing centraliza156
tion of databases. Therefore, any legislation that creates a national,
unified healthcare information infrastructure must also include adequate protection.

146

Pierre, supra note 12, at 550.
See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 350–53.
148
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
149
45 C.F.R. § 160.400–.426 (2007).
150
Id. § 160.404.
151
Peter P. Swire, Justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, June 7, 2005, http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2005/06/b743281.html.
152
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 11, at 357–58.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 384–86.
156
See id.
147
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III. THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH
RECORD INFRASTRUCTURE
Several bills have been proposed in Congress to create a unified,
157
The central purposes of enactnational healthcare infrastructure.
ing such legislation are to increase the quality of healthcare and to
reduce costs associated with the storage and transmission of health
158
These bills, which create a healthcare system more
information.
vulnerable to abuse and misappropriation of personal information,
typically ignore the enhanced need for privacy protection; instead,
they assume that the current scheme of protection will be suffi159
cient. This Part gives an overview of bills that exemplify the current
approaches to creating a unified, national healthcare information infrastructure: the Wired for Health Care Quality Act, the Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006, and the Independent
Health Record Bank Act of 2006. In addition, the bills discussed in
160
this section are also likely to be passed in the near future.
A. Wired for Health Care Quality Act
The Wired for Health Care Quality Act (“Wired Act”) is intended to stimulate the creation of a “nationwide, interoperable
health information technology system to improve the quality and re161
duce the costs of health care in the United States.” This bill aims to
achieve this goal through, among other things, establishing an Office

157

See Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006, S. 3454, 109th Cong.
(2006); Wired for Health Care Quality Act, S. 1418, 109th Cong. (2005); Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006, H.R. 4157, 109th Cong. (2005).
158
See S. 3454 (“to improve the exchange of healthcare information through the
use of new technology . . . [,]to use such records to build a nationwide health information technology infrastructure, and to promote participation in health information exchange by consumers through tax incentives”); S. 1418 (“To enhance the
adoption of a nationwide interoperable health information technology system and to
improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care in the United States.”); H.R.
4157 (“To promote a better health information system.”).
159
These bills primarily rely on the HIPAA privacy regulations to prevent misuse
of personal health information. See infra Part II.A–C.
160
For example, the Wired for Health Care Quality Act has been passed by the
Senate and, according to StateNet legislative forecasts, has a ninety-eight percent
chance of being passed by a House of Representatives Committee and a ninety-six
percent chance of being passed by the House of Representatives. See Statenet, Legislative Forecasts, S. 1418, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com (go to “Federal
Legal – U.S.”; then click “Legislative Histories and Materials”; then search “S. 1418”
under “Congressional Bills Legislative Forecasts”). Moreover, the Health Information Promotion Act of 2005 was passed in the House of Representatives on July 27,
2006. See H. Roll No. 416 (2006).
161
S. 1418, 109th Cong. (2005).
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of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
162
(ONC) within the Office of the Secretary of HHS to coordinate the
adoption of uniform electronic health information standards; establishing an American Health Information Collaborative to promulgate
163
recommendations to be considered by various federal agencies;
and by providing grants to private entities for compliance with the
164
bill. The Wired Act was introduced by Senator Enzi of Wyoming on
165
July 18, 2005, and was passed by the Senate on November 17, 2005.
Although the bill includes provisions protecting private health information, they are insufficient for the uniform health information
infrastructure that the bill attempts to establish.
Initially, the bill defines various terms to provide guidance and
166
elucidate the scope of its provisions.
The bill defines the term
“Health Care Provider” to include hospitals, skilled nursing facilities,
home health entities, healthcare clinics, group practices, pharmacies,
laboratories, physicians, and any other entities determined appropri167
This definition is more specific than
ate by the Secretary of HHS.
168
that in HIPAA and is broad in scope since the Secretary of HHS has
169
Additionally, it is notable
the ability to include additional entities.
that the bill defines “Qualified Health Information Technology” as a
“computerized system” that “protects the privacy and security of
health information,” allows permitted access to electronic health information, “incorporates decision support to reduce medical errors,”
170
and complies with standards under the bill.
Thereafter, this bill provides that the ONC would be headed by a
“National Coordinator” to be appointed by and report to the Secre171
tary of HHS. The duties of the ONC would entail coordinating federal agencies and private entities in developing a national health information infrastructure to protect patients’ individually identifiable
information, improve the quality of healthcare, reduce medical er-

162

Id. § 2902.
Id. § 2903.
164
Id. §§ 2904–2906.
165
Congressional Information Service, Bill Tracking Report, S. 1418, 2005,
http://www.lexisnexis.com (go to “Federal Legal – U.S.”; then click “Legislative Histories and Materials”; then search “S. 1418” under “Bill Tracking Report-Current
Congress”).
166
S. 1418 § 2901.
167
Id. § 2901(1).
168
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007).
169
S. 1418 § 2901(1).
170
Id. § 2901(6).
171
Id. § 2902(a).
163
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rors, reduce healthcare costs, facilitate the exchange of information
172
Moreover, the
between entities, and facilitate medical research.
National Coordinator of the ONC would directly advise the Secretary
173
of HHS and the President.
The ONC will also be allowed to request federal agencies to assign their employees to the office for assis174
tance in achieving its goals.
Next, the bill would establish the American Health Information
Collaborative (AHIC), a quasi-public organization that will serve as a
forum for discussing issues related to establishing and implementing
an interoperable healthcare infrastructure and for “recommend[ing]
. . . standards for the electronic exchange of health[care] informa175
tion.”
The AHIC would be composed of an even distribution of
representatives from “consumer or patient organizations,” healthcare
providers, health insurance plans, third-party payors, information
technology vendors, privacy and security organizations, and purchas176
Moreover, the representatives would serve for a
ers or employers.
177
The AHIC would be responsible for submaximum of two years.
mitting annual policy recommendations to increase system efficiency
178
and security.
Thereafter, HHS and other federal agencies would
review these recommendations and determine whether they should
179
be implemented by the federal government.
These regulations
would only govern federal agencies and would be entirely voluntary
180
for private entities.
The Wired Act includes many provisions aimed at protecting individually identifiable health information from wrongful use and dis181
closure.
However, there are several reasons why this bill lacks adequate privacy protection. The main deficiency is that the regulations
182
Regulation of the
would be mandatory only for federal agencies.
private sector is premised on the belief that private entities will volun183
tarily abide by the standards set forth by HHS and the AHIC. However, it is naïve to expect private entities to voluntarily incur the sub172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. § 2902(b)(1)–(9).
Id. § 2902(c).
Id. § 2902(d).
S. 1418 § 2903(a)(3).
Id. § 2903(b).
Id.
Id. § 2903(c)–(d).
Id. § 2903(e).
Id. § 2903(h).
See S. 1418 § 2903(h).
Id.
Id.
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stantial costs of purchasing new technology and implementing ad184
Moreover, as has been shown in previous
ministrative standards.
Parts of this Comment, allowing private industry to regulate itself
typically results in lenient standards and a lack of adequate protec185
tion. Thus, this bill is as limited in protecting information in the
private sector as is the Privacy Act of 1974. Moreover, the Wired Act’s
attempt to create a seamless, uniform infrastructure for the storage
and transmission of electronic health information will be hindered
because it fails to apply the regulations to private industry. The result
would be a uniform, national federal agency infrastructure, with vast
differences between public and private standards. Consequently, the
bill’s ability to protect private information would be frustrated, since
electronic health information that is highly guarded by a federal
agency may be misappropriated when it is transferred to a private entity. It is unlikely that this system would allay public fears of inappropriate use of health information that cause patients to withhold in186
formation from practitioners. Therefore, to be effective, the Wired
Act must make its regulations mandatory for private entities.
B. Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006
The Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006
(HITPA) was introduced on October 27, 2005, by Representative
Johnson of Connecticut to “promote a better health information sys187
The bill was subsequently passed by the House of Representem.”
188
tatives. HITPA requires standards to be promulgated by the federal
government regarding the adoption and implementation of improved technology to create a uniform, national health information
189
However, the bill would establish few privacy safeinfrastructure.
guards and is insufficient to protect individuals’ private information
from misappropriation.

184

The Wired Act allows for federal grants to healthcare providers for implementing the regulations and purchasing new technology resulting from the AHIC’s recommendations. Id. § 2905. However, to receive these grants, healthcare providers
must meet various requirements and must also spend one dollar on implementation
and new technology for every three dollars in government grants. Id. Therefore,
even in the event that a healthcare provider obtains a government grant, it must still
voluntarily choose to pay large sums of money to implement these standards.
185
See supra Part II.E.
186
See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
187
See Health Information Technology Promotion Act of 2006, H.R. 4157, 109th
Cong. (2005).
188
H. Roll No. 416 (2006).
189
See H.R. 4157 § 103.
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HITPA delineates a paradigm for the creation of a unified, national interoperable health information infrastructure similar to that
190
detailed in the Wired Act. HITPA would establish the Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology for essen191
tially the same purposes as described above.
Additionally, this bill
would require the National Coordinator to advise the Office of Management and Budget on health information issues and to be the
“promoter of health information technology in medically under192
served communities.” Further, the bill would require the American
Health Information Community to submit a report on the state of the
193
health information infrastructure and to make recommendations.
The bill recommends that measures should be taken to establish the
American Health Information Community as a more “permanent ad194
visory and facilitation entity.”
The bill further delineates the process by which the National
Coordinator, working with the American Health Information Community, would promulgate guidelines to promote a national health195
care infrastructure. The National Coordinator must first produce a
“strategic plan” with a schedule for analyzing and endorsing “core in196
A “core interteroperability guidelines” for “significant use cases.”
operability guideline” is defined as “a guideline to improve and promote the interoperability of health information technology” that “the
197
National Coordinator determines is essential and necessary.”
Moreover, a “significant use case” is “a category (as specified by the
National Coordinator) that identifies a significant use or purpose for
the interoperability of health information technology” including purposes such as transmitting laboratory information and health re198
cords.
The National Coordinator would then, consistent with the
199
Subseschedule, endorse certain core interoperability guidelines.
quently, these guidelines would be sent to the President, who must
ensure compliance by federal agencies that broadly collect or submit

190

Compare H.R. 4157, with Wired for Health Care Quality Act, S. 1418, 109th
Cong. (2005).
191
H.R. 4157 § 101.
192
Id.
193
Id. § 102.
194
Id.
195
Id. § 103.
196
Id.
197
H.R. 4157 § 103.
198
Id.
199
Id.
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200

health information. Beyond this, however, adherence to the guidelines would be entirely voluntary for federal agencies and private en201
tities.
HITPA also includes provisions for updating standards for electronic exchanges, providing incentives for physicians to implement
new technology, and conducting studies on various aspects of health
202
The bill would establish a method by
information technology.
which standard-setting organizations may attain expedited implemen203
tation of upgrades or additions to data transmission standards.
Standard-setting organizations would be able to notify the Secretary
of HHS that they are upgrading or improving their codes or formats
for transmitting health information, and the Secretary would then
204
publish a notice in the Federal Register, and allow the public to
205
Next, the Committee on Vital Health
comment on the proposal.
Statistics would hold a hearing, which would include testimony from
206
the public.
The Committee would then deliver recommendations
to the Secretary regarding adoption of the upgrade or improve207
ment.
Finally, the Secretary would determine whether these
208
This allows for expedited imchanges should be implemented.
plementation of the newest and most advanced standards for the
209
transmission of health-related data.
Additionally, HITPA would
provide safe-harbor provisions to anti-kickback civil and criminal
penalties and exemptions from physician referral limitations “for
[the] provision of health information technology and training ser210
vices” to encourage physicians to adopt new technology. Moreover,
the bill would require studies on the impact of health information
technology in certain areas of healthcare and the likelihood that cer211
Among
tain changes to the healthcare system will be successful.
other things, these studies would examine the need for unification of

200

Id. Federal agencies broadly collecting and submitting health information
must be in compliance with these guidelines within three years of their endorsement
by the National Coordinator. Id.
201
Id.
202
See id. §§ 201–407 (2005).
203
H.R. 4157 § 201.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
H.R. 4157 § 201.
210
Id. §§ 301–302.
211
Id. §§ 401–407.
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212

state laws, the ability to integrate health information technology in
213
home healthcare, and the methods through which to use health in214
This combinaformation technology to manage chronic diseases.
tion of provisions seems to be aimed toward encouraging physicians
and healthcare providers to adopt technology that is current and adequately suited to the needs of the healthcare industry.
HITPA cannot be expected to realistically induce the creation of
a unified, interoperable healthcare system with proper security and
privacy protections. Although the bill does mention maintaining privacy and security in health information, it does little to ensure that, if
215
enacted, privacy and security regulations will be promulgated. The
bill focuses almost entirely on improving efficiency in the healthcare
industry without significantly considering health information privacy
216
and security concerns. The bill never mentions any specific privacy
or security measures to counteract the increased threats incident to a
unified, national health information infrastructure.
Moreover, the scope of any privacy regulations would be extremely limited. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
HHS would only be applied to selected federal agencies through the
217
actions of the President.
Further, these agencies would have three
218
It is absurd to believe that
years to comply with such regulations.
this three-year lag-time will not circumvent the bill’s attempt to ensure the use of the most current technology through expedited en219
As
dorsement of improvements to data transmission standards.
220
mentioned above in the analysis of the Wired Act, it is also nonsensical to expect private industry to expend considerable resources on
voluntary privacy and security regulations. Therefore, any privacy or
security regulations promulgated pursuant to this bill would not be
applied to adequately protect the privacy of sensitive health information. Consequently, this bill would not increase efficiency in the
healthcare system by reducing the amount of information withheld

212

Id. § 401.
Id. § 402.
214
Id. § 407.
215
See H.R. 4157 §§ 101–102.
216
Id. § 101. The Act lists providing for the “confidentiality and security of individually identifiable health information” eighth on a list of thirteen goals of a “Nationwide Interoperable Health Information Technology Infrastructure.” Id.
217
Id. § 103.
218
Id.
219
Id. § 201.
220
See supra Part III.A.
213
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by members of the public from medical practitioners due to fears of
misappropriation.
C. Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006
Introduced on June 6, 2006, by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, the Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006 (IHRBA)
would establish and utilize a unique system of independent health re221
cord banks to create a national healthcare infrastructure. This bill
would also encourage participation by individuals, healthcare provid222
ers, and employers through a series of tax incentives and through
223
A few purposes of this
health record banks sharing their revenue.
health information infrastructure are to improve healthcare quality,
to promote disease prevention and management of chronic illnesses,
to ensure that medical information is available for decision making,
to increase the efficiency and reduce the cost of healthcare, and to
224
ensure confidentiality of individually identifiable information.
Within a year of Congressional enactment of this bill, the Secretary of Commerce must promulgate standards for “the establishment
225
and certification of independent health record banks.”
Record
banks would hold lifetime electronic health records for their members, and would be interconnected to form a “national health infor226
Moreover, these health records “may contain
mation network.”
227
Record banks would be
health plan and debit card functionality.”
treated as covered entities under HIPAA, and may carry out health228
care clearinghouse activities.
Additionally, IHRBA would require
229
record banks to be non-profit entities, and not deny membership to
230
any individual.
Record banks would be able to finance their activities in various
ways. First, record banks could charge healthcare entities and indi231
vidual account holders fees for using the bank. Second, they could
sell non-identifiable and partially identifiable health information to

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Independent Health Record Bank Act of 2006, S. 3454, 109th Cong. (2006).
Id. § 4(a)(4)–(5), (e)(3).
Id. § 4(e)(2).
Id. § 2.
Id. § 4.
Id.
S. 3454 § 4(a).
Id. §§ 4(b), 5.
Id. § 4(b).
Id. § 4(c).
Id. § 4(e).
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232

research facilities.
Finally, they could generate revenue through
“any other activities determined appropriate by the Secretary [of
233
However, a record bank would have to share any
Commerce].”
revenue that it accumulates with account holders, and may share its
234
revenue with healthcare providers and payers.
IHRBA would limit the disclosures of health information that
235
record banks may make.
Generally, a record bank could only disclose an individual’s independent health record with the prior con236
sent of the individual.
Moreover, a record bank would have to
237
However,
comply with the provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
there is an exception to the consent requirement for emergency
238
situations.
A record bank could allow healthcare providers to access “a limited, authenticated data set concerning an individual for
emergency response purposes” during an emergency room visit,
239
In addition, when sellwithout prior consent from the individual.
ing health information, a record bank may only disclose an individual’s non-identifiable or partially identifiable health information
240
The record bank and the inupon meeting several requirements.
241
dividual must agree to any such sale.
IHRBA would afford individual consumers certain rights regard242
ing their independent health record.
The individual would maintain ownership over his or her complete health record, and would
243
have the right to review it at any time.
Further, the individual
would be able to add information to his or her health record, and
could seek to amend information in his or her record according to
244
Howstandards to be prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce.
ever, the healthcare entity “shall serve as the custodian of . . . information that has been added by such entity to the health record of an
245
individual.”
232

Id.
S. 3454 § 4(e).
234
Id.
235
See id. §§ 4(d), 6.
236
Id. § 6(a).
237
Id. § 6(d).
238
Id. § 6(c)(2).
239
S. 3454 § 6(c)(2).
240
Id. § 6(b)(1)–(7).
241
Id. § 6(b)(1).
242
Id. § 4(d)(1).
243
Id. The individual can review the contents of his or her health record “at any
time during the normal business operating hours of the bank.” Id.
244
Id.
245
S. 3454 § 4(d)(2).
233
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IHRBA includes several incentives to encourage participation in
the health record bank system by individuals, employers, and healthcare entities. As mentioned above, the bill would require record
banks to share any revenue resulting from the sale of health informa246
tion with its members. A record bank could also share this revenue
247
The bill would make this even more luwith healthcare providers.
crative by exempting the revenue from taxable income under the In248
ternal Revenue Code.
Thus, individuals and healthcare providers
would contribute more information to electronic health records to
249
make them as valuable as possible.
Additionally, IHRBA would
amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow employers a tax credit for
up to fifty dollars per employee for any investments made to maintain
250
that employee’s independent health record. This would encourage
employer and employee participation in independent health record
251
banks.
Finally, IHRBA includes measures to assure compliance with the
bill and its regulations. First, IHRBA includes provisions for regula252
tory oversight of record banks.
The bill would require the Secretary of Commerce to “develop a program to certify entities to operate
independent health record banks,” to track economic activity of record banks, and to establish an “interagency council” to audit record
253
The interagency counsel would be responsible for auditing
banks.
254
record banks and recommending privacy and security protections.
These protections would include record banks notifying individuals
when their privacy is breached, implementing security measures to
restrict access to information, and analyzing the risk of a security
255
breach.
Second, IHRBA would require states to establish a state
agency to address complaints by state residents pertaining to a record
256
Moreover, record banks would have to provide these state
bank.
agencies with information regarding the record bank’s policies and
257
regarding its use and storage of information. Third, IHRBA would
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

Id. § 4(e).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 4(a)(5).
Id. § 10.
S. 3454 § 4(a)(4).
Id. § 8.
Id. § 8(a).
Id. § 8(b).
Id.
Id. § 7(b).
S. 3454 § 7(b).
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attempt to ensure compliance by making civil and criminal penalties
258
IHRBA would
available for wrongful disclosure by a record bank.
259
do this by applying HIPAA civil and criminal penalties to record
260
banks.
Finally, IHRBA would subject record banks’ transmission
and use of data to all applicable existing federal and state privacy and
261
security protections.
IHRBA commodifies personal health information on a scale
never before attempted in the United States. This bill seeks to estab262
lish record banks throughout the United States, and would give in263
Such a sysdividuals a property right in their health information.
tem could greatly increase efficiency in the healthcare system while
protecting privacy. This type of system, however, raises various concerns regarding its effectiveness and privacy. For one thing, commentators have criticized granting a privacy right in personal infor264
mation.
Moreover, the increasing value of electronic health
records augments the incentives for misappropriation. Finally, reliance on the HIPAA Privacy Rule would be grossly inadequate under
this regime. HIPAA allows a healthcare provider to condition treatment of an individual on that individual’s authorizing the healthcare
provider to disclose the individual’s medical information to research
265
Thus, a healthcare provider would be able to sell the infacilities.
formation directly to a research facility and effectively cut out the re266
This would result in a loss of revenue to
cord bank middle-man.
267
record banks and individuals, which would negate the incentives
for individual and healthcare provider participation in record
268
banks. IHRBA would be successful only if it includes additional pri-

258

Id. § 9.
42. U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2003).
260
S. 3454 § 9.
261
Id. § 7(a).
262
Id. § 2. The purpose of the Act is to create a “nationwide health information
technology network, which implies that the record banks will be established
throughout the nation.” Id.
263
Id. § 4(d)(1)(a).
264
See infra Part IV (discussing the use of a property right in one’s personal health
information).
265
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4).
266
Compare id. (explaining that HIPAA can condition treatment on patient authorization for research related disclosure), with S. 3454 §§ 4(e)(b), 6(b) (allowing
banks to generate revenue through the sale of non-identifiable and partially identifiable information to third parties for research).
267
See S. 3454 §§ 4(e)(b), 6(b).
268
Id. § 4(e).
259
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vacy regulations and security protections to ensure that all personal
health information flows through the record banks securely.
IV. SOLUTION
A uniform, national health information infrastructure must employ a combination of methods to protect the privacy of personal
health information. A variety of methods are available for Congress
269
Substantially all of these methods,
to implement in its legislation.
however, have been criticized as being flawed in one way or another.
Thus, with the ever-increasing need for privacy protection, a solution
exists in employing a variety of these safeguards to provide layers of
protection, with each layer guarding against the inadequacy of other
layers.
The basis for a novel privacy protection paradigm can be the
recognition of a property right in one’s own health information. Although the commoditization of health information as a property
right has often been criticized, there are solutions to the problems
inherent in such commoditization. Consequently, applying these solutions allows the benefits of such a system to outweigh the negative
consequences.
First, it has been said that free alienability hinders the effective270
ness of using a property right to protect information privacy.
The
right of a property owner to freely transfer property rights to third
271
parties is a fundamental aspect of property law. Thus, by granting a
healthcare entity a right to use one’s propertized health information,
it is assumed that the individual is also granting the healthcare entity
a right to transfer the information to third parties for uses to which
272
the individual might not have originally agreed.
Second, it has
been claimed that the commoditization of information will result in
information market failure, which will cause people to trade away too
273
much personal information. Thus, it is claimed that utilizing property rights in personal information will increase trading in personal
274
information, and as a result, privacy will be reduced. Finally, critics
269

These methods include property rights, contractual protection, common law
or statutory causes of action, and criminal penalties. See infra Part IV.
270
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1137–
47 (2000).
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2076–84 (2004).
274
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000).
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argue that recognizing property rights in personal information is
275
contrary to a public benefit that exists from privacy protection.
Creating a property right in personal information has been described
276
as “anathema” and as “morally obnoxious.”
Moreover, it has been
said that propertizing personal information “may make no more
277
sense . . . than . . . to commodify voting rights.” Although there has
been much criticism of propertizing personal information, there are
significant benefits to utilizing property rights to protect such infor278
mation.
The main benefit of creating a property right in one’s personal
information is that it will shift bargaining power to the individual, as
opposed to the information collector. A common feature of current
279
privacy protection is that it relies on liability rules. Under a liability
rule, privacy is invaded, followed by some type of legal recourse, and
thereafter, the privacy invader pays a price for obtaining the informa280
Under a property scheme, however, the owner of a property
tion.
281
right is able to negotiate the sale of that person’s information.
Moreover, the pre-sale negotiation pursuant to a property regime allows the individual to determine the value of the individual’s information. Therefore, the value of one’s privacy will not be determined
282
by a data collector, court, or legislative body as in a liability regime.
Although such a system could lead to personal information becoming
under-valued and sold at too low of a price, it would be possible for
individuals to form collective organizations to determine the appropriate value of their members’ information and negotiate with information gathering entities on behalf of a large group of individuals.
Additional benefits of a property regime include forcing businesses to internalize externalities associated with data collection as
well as property rights running with the property. Requiring businesses to internalize the costs associated with information gathering
leads to more prudent decision-making regarding the collection and
283
use of personal information. Therefore, the propertization of data
may lead to a reduction in the overall amount of data being col275

Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2084–90.
Samuelson, supra note 270, at 1143.
277
Id.
278
See infra notes 279–85 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of using
property rights to protect personal information).
279
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.2, at 279–80 (2006).
280
See id.
281
See id.
282
See id.
283
McClurg, supra note 28, at 91–92.
276
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284

lected.
Propertization will also result in individuals receiving a pecuniary benefit in exchange for the use of their personal information.
Additionally, limitations on property rights will run with the property
285
interest, and therefore, protection will apply to third parties.
The problems caused by free alienability inherent in a propertybased privacy protection regime may be answered with a somewhat
obvious solution: restricting alienability. Although privacy critics argue that free alienability is a fundamental principle in privacy law and
therefore unavoidably hinders utilization of property rights to protect
286
privacy, restrictions on alienability are equally fundamental aspects
287
Paul Schwartz, a leading privacy advocate,
of intellectual property.
compares limited alienability of an information property right to the
successful restrictions on alienability allowed in modern copyright
288
Correspondingly, Schwartz proposes a “model of propertized
law.
289
personal information” which relies on “hybrid inalienability.”
This
model “unpack[s]” the “bundle of sticks” commonly associated with a
property right and puts limits on the rights of use and transferability
in the property that “follow[] personal information through downstream transfers and limit[] the negative effects that result from ‘one290
Therefore, legislation
shot’ permission to all personal data trade.”
creating a uniform national healthcare infrastructure will be able to
adequately restrict alienability, assuming healthcare entities comply
with the applicable statutes and regulations.
The advent of a health information property regime facilitates,
and increases the efficacy of, the second “layer” of health information
291
privacy protection: safeguarding privacy through contract.
Traditionally, the formation of a contract includes two or more parties
bargaining to exchange consideration, making offers and counteroffers, and subsequently agreeing to and accepting the terms of the
292
Ideally, then, the use of contracts to protect privacy
contract.
284

Id.
See notes 291–303 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of contractbased privacy protections).
286
Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2091. Free alienability “is considered by many to
be an inevitable aspect of property.” Id.
287
Id. at 2092; see also Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy,
82 OR. L. REV. 695, 729 (2003).
288
Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2092.
289
Id. at 2094.
290
Id. at 2094–96.
291
See infra notes 292–93 and accompanying text (discussing the use of property
as consideration).
292
CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1–161 (5th ed. 2003).
285
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should allow the individual and the entity seeking to use the information to bargain and come to an agreement on the terms of the contract. Thus, using a property right as consideration, an individual
should be able to tailor an entity’s use of the property to suit his or
her needs, and will not agree to unsuitable terms. However, data collecting entities typically use adhesion contracts, leaving little or no
293
Many healthcare entities already use
opportunity for bargaining.
confusing language in their privacy notices, causing patients to be
unaware of their rights and the entity’s potential uses of their per294
Consequently, information-gathering entities
sonal information.
295
effectively coerce individuals to consent to unfair terms. Moreover,
many information gatherers include provisions enabling the entities
296
to change the terms in their privacy policies at random. Therefore,
many argue that legislatures must adopt default rules in information
privacy contracts, typically utilizing opt-in requirements in order to
297
Using default rules will shield unsuspectdeviate from the default.
ing individuals from releasing their rights unwillingly. Consequently,
they will restore an individual’s ability to bargain for favorable con298
tract terms.
Additionally, when an individual uses the law of contracts to protect privacy, the extent of the protection afforded by the contract is
limited to enforcement against those parties who are in privity of con299
tract with the individual. Thus, a third party cannot be sued under
contract law for appropriating data given as consideration pursuant
300
to a contract.
For example, a data collecting entity could freely
transfer the rights granted to it pursuant to a contract to a third
party, and the original party to the contract would have no rights
against that third party. However, if a property right is recognized in
personal information, then third parties would not be immune from
suit from the original “owners” due to the fundamental principle that

293

Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1265 (1998).
294
See Pollio, supra note 136, at 593.
295
See Kang, supra note 293, at 1265.
296
Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2080.
297
See Kang, supra note 293, at 1270–72; Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2416–17 (1996);
Schwartz, supra note 273, at 2100–06.
298
See Murphy, supra note 297, at 2404–16 (analyzing empirical data showing the
efficiency and lowered transaction costs associated with using contractual default
rules to protect information privacy).
299
KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 292, at 494.
300
See id.

MCMAHON_FINALV2

2008]

4/11/2008 10:59:23 AM

819

COMMENT
301

property rights run with the property interest.
This means that
property rights “can be enforced against subsequent transferees of
302
Moreover, third parother rights in the [personal information].”
ties will not be allowed an interest in property granted by a second
303
party without the authority to make such a grant.
By creating a
property right, the first “layer” of protection under this Comment’s
proposed paradigm partially safeguards against the inadequacies of
contractual privacy protection.
Nevertheless, it is naïve to conclude that a property right in personal information is sufficient to contain such information within the
304
realm of contractually bound second parties.
Consequently, tort
liability for misappropriation must serve as a third “layer” of protection. Without a private cause of action for misappropriation, there is
little to stop entities from wrongfully obtaining information from individuals, as well as from second parties. For example, as mentioned
in the foregoing paragraph, a secondary party cannot grant to a third
party a greater property interest than that which it owns. Thus, if a
second party disregards a restriction on alienability and subsequently
transfers its property interest to a third party, the third party’s interest
is voided. This works well for property interests in land or other tangible property, but it disintegrates when dealing with intangible
305
Consequently, attaching
property, such as personal information.
civil liability to third-party misappropriation is necessary to deter
prohibited use and acquisition.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, tort litigation may increase the efficiency of this privacy protection scheme. First, although transaction
costs associated with complex litigation may commonly reduce efficiency, those transaction costs, in addition to any ensuing civil dam306
ages, have the effect of deterring misappropriation. Second, allow301

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerous Clauses Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374
(2002).
302
Id.
303
See id. at 375.
304
See McClurg, supra note 28, at 96–97.
305
The reason is that the holder of intangible, intellectual property may freely
alienate such property while retaining the entire, original interest. See Lipton, supra
note 287, at 728–36. It is very difficult to retake possession of private information
once it has been disclosed because it is intangible. See id. Indeed, a third party
wrongfully obtaining personal information might not abide by contractual restrictions on use that bound the second party, since the third party is not in privity with
the original owner. See supra notes 291–303 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations of contractual privacy protection).
306
McClurg, supra note 28, at 101.
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ing injured parties to seek compensation assures that motivated
plaintiffs will aggressively pursue claims against the entities that
307
caused their harm. Plaintiffs seeking “personal justice and redress”
are in a better position for success than, for example, members of a
308
government regulatory agency. Third, civil discovery pursuant to a
lawsuit is more likely to yield information pertaining to the violative
309
practices of an entity than an investigation by a federal agency.
This is evidenced by the current dearth of knowledge about the se310
Finally, assumcretive practices of information gathering entities.
ing the privacy claims would meet the requirements for class action
certification, having a private cause of action would allow plaintiffs to
aggregate their claims. Consequently, individual harms that are too
minor to be worth the costs of litigation may be aggregated to make
311
litigation profitable.
Thus, under a tort liability scheme, entities
are deterred from harming vast numbers of individuals in such a minor way as to avoid liability. Further, unlike other methods of privacy
protection, creating a private cause of action is relatively easy and in307

Id. at 100.
Id.
[L]egislation would probably not be effective in controlling information privacy unless it created a strong incentive for someone to enforce
it. . . . If congressional committees and regulatory agencies are the
sheriff, tort plaintiffs and their lawyers are the bounty hunters. People
who have a personal stake in the outcome have a much stronger incentive to influence the outcome . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
309
Id. at 99.
Conventional wisdom says that legislative and agency bodies are better venues for collecting information about social policy issues. At least
in the context of consumer data, that view may be wrong. Studying
transcripts of the FTC’s major “workshop” on consumer data fails to
answer the most important questions regarding data mining and profiling. Most notably, not a single sample of a consumer data profile was
produced at the workshop, despite vigorous attempts by a leading privacy advocate to obtain profile samples in advance. The workshop
transcript reflects amiability among the participants that is ill-suited to
the goal of meaningful fact finding. For the most part, these agency
investigators pitched softball questions that industry representatives
safely bunted with vague answers.
Civil discovery in the U.S. is an extremely liberal process that allows
broad inquiries in an attempt to ferret out relevant facts. The civil discovery process, backed up by the power of court orders, including the
potential for sanctions, can be a much more potent method of fact investigation than government hearings.
Id. (citations omitted).
310
McClurg, supra note 28, at 98–99.
311
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 351–52 (2003).
308

MCMAHON_FINALV2

2008]

4/11/2008 10:59:23 AM

COMMENT

821

312

expensive.
Legislation may create a private cause of action by
merely including a provision stating that one shall exist. Moreover,
courts are free to create a common law cause of action to deal with
313
Hence, a private cause of action should be cremisappropriation.
ated to supplement any legislation creating a unified national health
information infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to health information privacy, deemed “sacred” by the
314
Supreme Court, is being whittled away by legislation containing lit315
It has been shown that misappropriatle or no privacy protection.
tion and wrongful disclosure of private health information can have
316
devastating consequences.
Nevertheless, Congress has focused almost exclusively on increasing efficiency in healthcare, ignoring the
potential harm caused by inadequate privacy protection.
This Comment, while recognizing that no conventional method
of privacy protection is flawless, proposes a regime that relies on
three layers of protection, so that the inadequacies of each is counteracted by the strengths of the others. Consequently, this paradigm
ensures adequate protection in a national, unified health information
infrastructure.

312
313
314
315
316

McClurg, supra note 28, at 97–98.
Id.
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part II.A.

